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10 Est. of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff'd and
rev'd, 93-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,386 (8th Cir. 1993).
11 98 T.C. 341 (1992) (cancellation of installment note
treated as disposition; reported on decedent's final
return).
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(f).
13 Id.
14 I.R.C. § 1(e).
15 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13201(c), Pub. L.
103-66, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
COWS-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff was injured when
the plaintiff’s truck struck several cows on a highway. The
cows belonged to the defendants and had escaped from
separate fenced pastures. The defendants had both moved
for a directed verdict in the trial but the court allowed the
case to go to the jury which awarded damages to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff had presented evidence of prior
escapes by the cows of both defendants and the poor
condition of the fences. The plaintiff also provided expert
testimony that the fences were inadequate because the
fences allowed the cows to stick their heads through the
fences, which encouraged the cows to attempt to break
through the fences. The appellate court held that the
evidence was sufficient to raise factual issues of the
defendants’ negligence to allow the case to go to the jury.
Carver v. Kinnett, 434 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. App. 1993).
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff was injured
when the plaintiff’s car struck a horse owned by the
defendants. The plaintiff sued the defendants for
negligently, willfully and wantonly allowing the horse to
run at large on a highway. The trial court granted the
defendant summary judgment. The appellate court reversed
holding that Ala. Code § 3-5-14(a) (making it unlawful for
persons having custody of livestock to allow the livestock to
run at large in the police jurisdiction of a city) created a
duty in the defendant not to negligently allow the horse to
run at large and that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence of prior escapes by the horse to raise a fact issue
as to whether the defendant was negligent in fencing the
horse. The court noted that the degree of care required is
dependent upon the animal involved and the nearness of the
enclosure to public highways. Lollar v. Poe, 622 So.2d 902
(Ala. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS-ALM § 13.03[3].*  The
debtor was a cotton merchant who stored cotton in the
creditor’s warehouse. The creditor’s billing procedure was
to invoice the cotton owners for storage and shipping costs
when the cotton was removed from the warehouse. The
invoices stated that payment was due in seven days but the
creditor presented evidence in the industry and between the
creditor and debtor that late payments of nine to 19 days
were ordinarily allowed before more stringent payment
terms were imposed. The trustee had sought recovery of
payments made by the debtor to the creditor within 90 days
prior to the petition as preferential. The creditor claimed
that the payments were eligible for the Section 547(b)(2)(C)
exception for payments made in the ordinary course of
business. The trustee had argued that the most extreme
incidents of late payments in the pre-preferential period
should be excluded from consideration but that the most
extreme incidents of late payments during the preferential
period were not in the ordinary course of business. The
court held that the entire history of payments between the
creditor and the debtor and the creditor and the other clients
was relevant to the issue and the history demonstrated that
the late payments made by the debtor were within the
ordinary course of business practiced by the creditor to all
clients; therefore, the late payments made during the 90
days before the petition were not preferential. In re Julien
Co., 157 B.R. 834 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AMENDMENT. The debtors originally filed for Chapter
11 and claimed the federal homestead exemption to the
extent of the debtors’ equity in the house. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 and the debtors amended the
exemption to claim the exemption under the Washington
homestead exemption. During this time, the home increased
in value by almost $80,000. The trustee objected to the
amendment as in bad faith and prejudicial to creditors. The
court held that the amendment would be allowed because
the initial exemption claimed prevented the sale of the
house and all appreciation in the house belonged to the
debtors. In re Hall, 1 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption and sought to avoid judicial liens which
impaired the exemption. The court held that under Illinois
law, judicial liens cannot attach to the debtor’s exemption
amount; therefore, the judicial liens could not impair the
debtor’s homestead exemption rights. In re Haynes, 157
B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1992).
CONVERSION OF ASSETS. One month prior to filing
for bankruptcy, the debtor consulted with an attorney and
converted non-exempt property into an exempt annuity. The
trustee objected to the annuity exemption as improper pre-
bankruptcy planning. The court held that because no
evidence was presented that the conversion occurred under
imminent threat of levy, attachment, garnishment or
execution, the conversion was not improper. In re Swecker,
157 B.R. 694 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
CONVERSION OF CASE. The debtor had filed a
Chapter 13 case in which the plan was confirmed.  The
debtor had claimed, as exempt, interests in two IRA's.  The
debtor converted the case to Chapter 7 and the trustee
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objected to the exemptions for the interests in the IRA's,
arguing that a recent state case had declared the exemptions
unconstitutional prior to the conversion.  The lower courts
held that the debtor was not entitled to the exemptions
because as of the date of the conversion, the exemptions
were not allowed. The appellate court reversed, holding that
the exemptions available on the date of the original petition
applied to the converted case.  In re Marcus, 1 F.3d 1050
(10th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 140 B.R. 803 (D. Colo. 1992),
aff'g, 128 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor and spouse filed a joint
bankruptcy petition and each claimed the $5,000 homestead
exemption in a house. Although both debtors owned the
house, only the spouse and children lived in the house. The
court held that the debtor was entitled to the homestead
exemption  because the debtor’s dependents lived there. In
re Miller, 157 B.R. 621 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
LIFE INSURANCE. At the time of the filing of the
petition, the debtor sought a declaratory judgment against
an insurance company for payment of the proceeds of a life
insurance policy after the death of the debtor’s spouse. A
creditor had obtained a judgment against the debtor and had
served a notice of garnishment on the insurance company
and filed a claim in the bankruptcy case. The debtor moved
to avoid the judgment lien as impairing the exemption for
the insurance proceeds under Ill. Stat. § 5/12-1001(f). The
creditor argued that the life insurance proceeds exemption
was limited by Ill. Stat. § 5/12-1001(h) to the amount
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor. The
court acknowledged that the two statutes overlapped in their
grant of exemptions for spouses for the proceeds of life
insurance policy on spouses, but held that the more general
statute applied to  allow a 100 percent exemption and
avoidance of the judicial lien. The other statute was held to
apply, somewhat inartfully, to cases not covered by the
more general statute. In re Bateman, 157 B.R. 635 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1993).
SETOFF. The debtor was a customer of a nonprofit
rural electric cooperative. Under the cooperative’s bylaws,
annual excess revenues are to be paid into capital accounts
for patronage capital credits for its customers. No interest or
dividends are paid on these credits and the credits cannot be
“retired” by payment to the customers except by vote of the
cooperative’s board of directors. The directors usually retire
credits 25 years after the credits were created such that in
the debtor’s case, the credits for 1967 and 1968 were
retired, although the directors did not authorize payment to
the debtor but sought setoff of the credits against amounts
owed to the cooperative by the debtor for electrical service.
The debtor argued that the credits were not eligible for
setoff because the credits were not an obligation of the
cooperative at the time of the petition. The court agreed and
ordered payment of the credits to the bankruptcy estate. The
debtor also sought recovery of the entire capital credit
because the debtor was liquidating in the bankruptcy case
and would terminate its account. The cooperative refused to
retire the credits. The court held that the debtor was not
entitled to turnover of the unretired credits because the
cooperative had never retired credits in less than 25 years
after the credits were created. Matter of Greensboro
Lumber Co., 157 B.R. 921 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN. A creditor objected the the debtor’s Chapter 12
plan as to (1) the value of stock in a family-owned farm
corporation, (2) the interest rate on plan payments on a debt
secured by farm land, and (3) the amount of payments to
unsecured creditors. An independent appraisal valued the
corporation by first valuing its property at fair market value
and applying a 25 percent discount to the debtor’s stock for
the minority interest, a 10 percent discount for lack of
marketability, and a 20 percent discount for restrictions on
corporate borrowing and transfer of shares. The court held
that the valuation was proper, and because the value was
higher than that used by the debtor, the plan could not be
confirmed unless amended to include the higher value in the
amount paid to unsecured creditors. The plan provided for
interest on deferred payments on a secured loan at 8.5
percent which the debtor stated was a “prime rate” plus 2
percent. The court held that the proper rate was the rate
charged for riskless loans plus an amount to account for the
risk factor. Because the debtor did not explain the source of
the interest rate used, the plan could not be confirmed. The
court also held that the amount paid to unsecured creditors,
plus all disposable income during the plan, met the
liquidation payments test if the debtor amended the plan to
include the higher stock valuation discussed above. In re
Harper, 157 B.R. 858 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . During the taxpayer’s
bankruptcy case, the IRS, in violation of the automatic stay,
assessed the taxpayer for additional I.R.C. § 6672 penalties.
The taxpayer did not object to the assessments during the
bankruptcy case which did not discharge the penalties. After
the close of the bankruptcy case, the taxpayer signed a Tax
Collection Waiver extending the statute of limitations on
collection of the penalties and agreed to pay the penalties in
installments. The taxpayer also requested liens against an
interest in a pension plan and the taxpayer’s home in order
to allow the taxpayer more time to pay the penalties. After
the extension on the statute of limitations expired, the
taxpayer petitioned for refund of the assessments made
during the bankruptcy case. Although the court
acknowledged that the assessments made in violation of the
automatic stay were void, the court held that the
assessments would be allowed because the taxpayer
willfully delayed objecting to the assessments until the IRS
was unable to correct the mistake and make proper
assessments after the bankruptcy case. Bronson v. U.S., 28
Fed. Cl. 756 (1993).
CLAIMS. The current opinion involved three cases: (1)
the debtors failed to include the IRS in its list of claims or
creditors until seven days before the bar date for claims, but
the IRS failed to object to the plan or confirmation and filed
a claim over two months after the bar date; (2) the IRS was
listed as a creditor but the IRS failed to object to the plan or
file a claim until more than two months after the bar date;
and (3) no notice of the case was sent to the IRS but the IRS
filed a claim 15 months after the bar date. The court held
that in all three cases, the IRS claims were barred as
untimely and could not be allowed as amended claims
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because no timely claim was filed. In re Turner, 157 B.R.
904 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993).
INTEREST AND PENALTIES. The debtor filed a
Chapter 13 case in 1980. The plan was confirmed in 1980
but the case was dismissed in 1983 when the debtor failed
to make all payments under the plan. The debtor filed a
second Chapter 13 case in 1986. A plan was confirmed but
the case was dismissed after the debtor failed to make all
plan payments. The debtor filed a third Chapter 13 case and
the IRS filed a claim which included interest and penalties
which accrued during the previous two cases. The court
held that the IRS could file a claim for the interest and
penalties accruing during a bankruptcy case where the
bankruptcy case is dismissed before the plan was
completed. In re Lyall, 157 B.R. 599 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1993).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The IRS filed a claim
under I.R.C. § 6672 for the 100 percent penalty as a
responsible person in a company which failed to pay federal
employment taxes. The debtor was a shareholder and officer
in the corporation which operated several restaurants and
admitted that the debtor had the authority to issue checks
for payment of the taxes but argued that the authority was
delegated to a management company. The court held that
the responsibility for the taxes could not be delegated where
the debtor retained the authority to make the payments.
I.R.S. v. Charlton, 2 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 1993).
TAX LIENS. The IRS made a pre-petition assessment
against the debtor for unpaid FICA taxes and filed a Notice
of Federal Tax Lien in the county recorder’s office. The
debtor originally filed in Chapter 11 but the case was
converted to Chapter 7 and the trustee sought to avoid the
tax lien as to vehicles owned by the debtor and sold by the
trustee. The court held that the trustee’s status as bona fide
purchaser of the estate property related back to the original
Chapter 11 petition and that the trustee could seek
avoidance of unperfected liens on estate property. The court
also held that the tax lien was unperfected because under
Florida law, liens on vehicles must be recorded on the
vehicle title in order to be perfected. Therefore, the tax liens
were unperfected and avoidable by the trustee. In re
Southern Transfer & Storage Co., 157 B.R. 691 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1993).
CONTRACTS
FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT. The plaintiff
purchased irrigated farm land from the defendant and
alleged that the defendant fraudulently concealed its
knowledge that several of the irrigation systems were in
poor shape and needed extensive repair. The plaintiff had
made several inspections of the farm before signing the
purchase agreement and the agreement stated that the sale
was “as is” and that the buyer had the right to inspect the
farm and to rescind the contract without cause. The plaintiff
was an experienced irrigation farmer and business owner
but failed to make a full inspection of the irrigation
equipment.  Although the evidence demonstrated that the
defendant had some knowledge that several of the wells
could be in poor condition, the court held that the plaintiff's
superior experience and the purchase contract provision
placed the duty on the plaintiff to inspect the irrigation
equipment before completing the purchase. Boegel v.
Colorado Nat’l Bank of Denver, 857 P.2d 1362 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1993).
COOPERATIVES
STOCK REDEMPTION-ALM § 14.02.*  The
defendant was a member of a cooperative marketing
association which had sued the defendant for payment of an
account with the cooperative. The defendant sought setoff
of the defendant’s stock and stock credits with the
cooperative. Under the cooperative's bylaws, stock could be
redeemed at the death of a member or the cessation of a
member’s eligibility for membership. The cooperative’s
board also had the authority to redeem stock when a
member reached a certain age or failed to patronize the
cooperative for more than three years. The defendant did
not meet any of the conditions for redemption of stock. The
court held that the stock was not a debt eligible for setoff
because the bylaws made the obligation to the member
contingent and not immediately payable. The court also
held that the cooperative's past early redemptions of stock in
setoff of members’ accounts did not make the current
refusal arbitrary or capricious because the prior setoffs were
minor in comparison. Hydro Co-op. Ass’n v. Shantz, 858
P.2d 123 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations expanding the range of
sanctions for fraud, misrepresentation, false claims and
other violations of contracts for insurance and to provide
insurance services. 58 Fed. Reg. 53109 (Oct. 14, 1993).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations establishing
the Actual Production History program which bases
insurance coverage on the insured’s actual production
history which will be multiplied by a percentage of an
elected coverage level and price per commodity unit to
determine the dollar amount of insurance coverage per acre.
58 Fed. Reg. 53150 (Oct. 14, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUITY-ALM § 6.04.* The decedent had been the
beneficiary of an annuity trust established by a predeceased
spouse. The trust provided for a fixed annual distribution
with a power in the decedent to withdraw an additional 5
percent of the trust assets. The IRS argued that the trust was
not an annuity to be valued under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
7(a) but a life interest limited by a term of years, valued
under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(e), because the trust would
be depleted if the decedent had lived to be 109 years old.
The court held that the trust was an annuity because Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-7 did not define a “term certain” to include
the time in which an annuity would be depleted. Est. of
Shapiro v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-483.
BASIS OF ESTATE PROPERTY. Prior to death, the
decedent transferred stock to the corporation’s ESOP,
purchased qualified replacement property, and made the
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election under I.R.C. § 1042(a) for the transactions. The
replacement property passed to the decedent’s estate. The
IRS ruled that because no disposition occurred upon
transfer of the property to the estate, no recapture under
I.R.C. § 1042(a) occurred and the basis of the property in
the estate’s hand would be determined under I.R.C. §
1014(a). Ltr. Rul. 9339005, June 23, 1993.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will provided for a bequest to a trust for three
beneficiaries with the remainder to pass to a church. Prior to
filing the estate tax return, the executor filed a petition in
state court for reformation of the trust to provide for
payment of equal shares to the beneficiaries of a unitrust
amount equal to the lesser of the annual trust net income or
6.7 percent of the net market value of the assets of the trust
as valued on the first day of each taxable year. If trust net
income exceeded 6.7 percent of the trust assets, the trustee
was to distribute so much of the excess net income so as to
make payments in prior years equal 6.7 percent of the trust
assets in those years. The IRS ruled that the original trust
was a reformable trust because the remainder interest would
have been eligible for a deduction but for the requirements
of I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2). The IRS also ruled that the
reformation would be allowed to qualify the trust remainder
interest for the charitable deduction because the value of the
reformed remainder interest did not exceed the value of the
former remainder interest by more than 5 percent. Ltr. Rul.
9339006, June 23, 1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* In 1958, a husband and wife established an
irrevocable trust for their children. In 1959, the husband’s
will created a second trust for the same children. The trusts
were identical except that the second trust allowed for
distribution of trust principal for the beneficiaries’
reasonable care, maintenance, medical care, support and
education. The two trusts were merged with the portion of
the trust assets in the second trust maintained separately for
purposes of enforcing the principal distribution rights. The
IRS ruled that the merger did not cause gain or loss to be
recognized and did not affect the basis or holding period of
the trust assets or beneficial interests. The IRS also ruled
that the merger would not subject the pre-1985 trusts to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9338020, June 24, 1993.
The taxpayer established two irrevocable trusts in 1981
for grandnephews and grandnieces with the taxpayer’s
spouse as trustee. The trustee had the power of income
distribution that was not subject to an ascertainable
standard. The taxpayer did not have the right to remove the
trustee but had the right to choose any successor trustee
except the taxpayer. The taxpayer made several post-
October 22, 1986 contributions to the trusts. The IRS ruled
that the trusts would not be included in the taxpayer’s gross
estate. The IRS also ruled that the portion of the trusts’
principal contributed after October 22, 1986 would be
subject to GSTT and the taxpayer’s GSTT exemption
amount. Ltr. Rul. 9340014, June 30, 1993.
The decedent had established a revocable trust in 1950
which had the decedent as lifetime beneficiary. The
decedent’s children would receive the trust corpus upon the
decedent’s death. The decedent became incompetent prior
to October 22, 1986 and remained so until death. An
attorney-in-fact was appointed by the decedent and the
attorney made several gifts for the decedent. The decedent’s
children executed disclaimers of their remainder interests,
causing the interests to pass to their issue. The IRS ruled
that the trust was exempt from GSTT and that the
disclaimers did not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9340027, June 30, 1993.
A trust was established in 1924 with equal shares for
three children. The beneficiaries had the power to withdraw
a portion of the trust corpus. In 1991 the trust was
partitioned into three equal trusts, one for each child. The
partitioning was ruled not to be an exercise of a power of
appointment but the power to withdraw trust corpus was
ruled to be a general power of appointment created before
October 21, 1942. One child died without exercising all of
the power to withdraw corpus and the child’s children, the
remainder holders, filed written disclaimers of their
interests in the decedent’s trust such that the trust property
of the decedent’s trust passed to the remainder holders’
children. The IRS ruled that the lapse of the decedent’s
power of withdrawal was not an addition to the trust
because the power did not cause the trust property to be
included in the decedent’s estate since the power was
created prior to October 21, 1942. Ltr. Rul. 9340053, July
12, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* After the
decedent’s death the will was contested by the surviving
spouse and a will settlement was reached for distribution of
the residuary estate between the surviving spouse and a
charitable organization. The IRS argued that the marital and
charitable deductions should be limited to the lesser of the
amount to have been distributed under the will or the actual
amount distributed. The court held that the actual amounts
distributed under the settlement would be allowed as
deductions because the settlement was the result of a bona
fide adversary proceeding involving enforceable rights. The
IRS also argued that the marital and charitable deductions
should be reduced by the amount of administrative
expenses, whether or not the expenses were paid from
principal or income. The court held that the administrative
expenses reduced the deduction only to the extent paid from
principal because, under Georgia law, the estate could pay
such expenses from principal or income as allowed by the
will. The court rejected a contrary holding in Est. of Street
v. Comm’r, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,122 (6th Cir.
1992). Est. of Hubert v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 22 (1993).
Under the decedent’s will, the residuary estate passed to
a credit shelter trust equal in amount to the unused unified
credit amount, with the remainder passing to a marital trust.
The executor had the discretion to charge administrative
expenses to either principal or income and choose to
allocate the expenses to estate income and deducted the
expenses on the fiduciary income tax return. The court held
that the allocation was proper because of the decedent’s
intent to maximize the marital deduction and Oklahoma law
which provided that absent any direction in the will,
administrative expenses were to be charged to estate
income. Est. of Allen v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 23 (1993).
Under the decedent’s will, the entire estate passed to the
surviving spouse for life or until the spouse remarried, with
a remainder interest in the decedent’s issue. The IRS ruled
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that the bequest was not eligible as QTIP because the
surviving spouse’s interest in the property could terminate
before death. Ltr. Rul. 9340018, June 30, 1993.
The decedent had established a 5-year grantor retained
annuity trust (GRIT) which provided that if the decedent
died within the five years and the decedent failed to
exercise a testamentary power of appointment of the trust
property, an equal share of the property passed to the
decedent’s two children. The decedent died within the five
years of the trust and did not exercise the power of
appointment. The children filed written disclaimers of their
interests in the trust property, which then passed by
intestacy to the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the
property passing by means of the disclaimers was eligible
for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9340052, July 12,
1993.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent died on November 26, 1981 and the decedent’s
will devised a 120 acre farm as tenants in common to a
child of the decedent’s brother and a child of the decedent’s
sister. The two cousins sold a 5 acre parcel to the child of
one cousin. The child resided on the parcel, and buildings
on the parcel were used in the farming operation on the
remaining 115 acres. The child materially participated in the
farm operation and owned a 25 percent interest in the
operation. The IRS ruled that the cousins were qualified
heirs under the definition of family member prior to the
effective date of ERTA 1981. The IRS also ruled that the
sale of the 5-acre parcel to the cousin’s child did not cause
the recapture of special use benefits if the child executed an
agreement consenting to personal liability for a recapture of
special use benefits. Ltr. Rul. 9340035, July 7, 1993.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent had created three irrevocable
trusts for grandchildren. The independent trustee had
unrestricted powers to distribute trust income and principal.
The decedent retained the right to remove the independent
trustee and appoint another independent trustee but could
not appoint the decedent as trustee. The IRS argued that the
power to replace the trustee was sufficient control over the
trustee to give the decedent the power to designate the
persons who were to possess or enjoy the trust property.
The court held that because the independent trustee was
under a fiduciary duty to exercise the trustee’s power in the
best interests of the beneficiaries, the decedent’s power to
replace the trustee was not sufficient to control trust
distributions. Est. of Wall v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 21
(1993).
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The taxpayer held an
interest in a house owned with the taxpayer’s spouse as
tenants in common. The taxpayer transferred the interest in
the house to a five-year trust. The house was subject to a
mortgage on which the taxpayer continued to be liable after
the house was transferred to the trust. Under the trust, the
taxpayer could continue to live in the house rent-free. If the
taxpayer died during the five years, the house passed to the
taxpayer’s estate. At the end of the five years, the trust
corpus passed to the taxpayer’s children. The IRS ruled that
the trust was a qualified personal residence trust and a
qualified annuity trust such that the retained interest of the
taxpayer would be valued under I.R.C. § 7520. Ltr. Rul.




INTEREST. The taxpayer, a corporation on the accrual
method of accounting and using a calendar tax year, issued
debentures which paid interest semi-annually but not on
June 30 and December 31 of each year. The debentures
were convertible to stock at the option of the bond holder
but the taxpayer would not pay the interest accrued nor
include the accrued interest in the value of the stock given
for the bond. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer could not
claim a deduction for the accrued interest for the period
between the last interest payment date and the end of the
taxable year because bond holders could convert the bonds
before the next interest payment date and the taxpayer
would not have to pay the accrued interest. Therefore, the
“all events” test of Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) had not been
met as of the end of the taxable year. Ltr. Rul. 9340001,
June 15, 1993.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayer formed a
charitable remainder unitrust funded with 20 percent of the
stock of the grantor’s family corporation. The trust provided
authority for the trustee to sell or exchange the stock but the
corporation, taxpayer and other family members claimed no
intent to buy the shares for at least one year and then only at
fair market value. The trust also provided that any death
taxes owed by the grantor’s estate could not be paid from
the trust but that if the trust became liable for such taxes, the
beneficiaries would be required to compensate the trust for
the payments in order to remain as beneficiary. The grantor
retained the power to remove the trustee and appoint the
grantor or any other person as trustee. The IRS ruled that
the trust was eligible for the charitable deduction and that
the grantor would not recognize income, gain or loss from
disposition of the stock by the trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9339018,
June 30, 1993.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The stock of the taxpayer, a corporation, was
purchased by one corporation from another corporation for
cash and a note secured by the assets of the taxpayer. The
purchaser funded the purchase with a loan from a bank. The
purchasing corporation merged into the taxpayer and the
taxpayer entered into negotiations to reduce the amount of
the note given to purchase the taxpayer’s stock. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer would be considered the purchaser of
the stock because the merger was intended as part of the
purchase and that any discharge of indebtedness income
could be used as a purchase price reduction.  Ltr. Rul.
9338029, June 25, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9338049, June 15,
1993.
HEDGES-ALM § 4.02[6].*  The temporary and
proposed regulations discussed in Neil Harl’s article in the
last issue, see p. 165 supra, were published at 58 Fed. Reg.
54037, 54075 (Oct. 20, 1993).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04.*  On its
1985 federal income tax return, the taxpayer corporation
elected to take a reduced investment tax credit instead of a
basis adjustment for qualified progress expenditures made
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in connection with the construction of a machine which
qualified as Section 38 property.  The taxpayer requested
permission to revoke the election because of the reduction
of corporate income tax rates passed in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. The IRS ruled that the revocation would not be
allowed because revocation is allowed only in extraordinary
circumstances and not where mere hindsight makes the
revocation more desireable. Ltr. Rul. 9339002, June 8,
1993.
MEDICAL EXPENSES. The IRS has announced that
it will not issue advance rulings or determination letters
concerning whether amounts paid for medical care,
including insurance, are deductible if the expenses do not
meet the conditions of I.R.C. § 213(d)(7). Rev. Proc. 93-43,
I.R.B. 1993-34.
The IRS has ruled that Rev. Rul. 75-302, 1975-2 C.B.
86, Rev. Rul. 75-303, 1975-2 C.B. 87, and Rev. Rul. 76-481,
1976-2 C.B. 82 should not be interpreted to allow a current
deduction for future medical care or insurance extending
substantially beyond the taxable year except where the
future care is purchased in connection with obtaining
lifetime care discussed in those rulings. Rev. Rul. 93-72,
I.R.B. 1993-34.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing the application of the minimum
funding requirements of I.R.C. § 412 for pension plans that
have been terminated and then restored by the sponsoring
employers. 58 Fed. Reg. 54489 (Oct. 22, 1993).
RETURNS. For individual taxpayers electing to pay in
installments the additional taxes caused by the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, the IRS is developing Form
8841 and has issued guidance for computing and making
the installment election. Notice 93-51, I.R.B. 1993-33.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
RE-ELECTION. In April 1991, one shareholder of an S
corporation transferred one share of stock to an ineligible
shareholder with the intent to terminate the S corporation
election. In December 1992, the shareholder reacquired the
share and all shareholders consented to a new S corporation
election, effective January 1, 1993. The IRS ruled that the
new election would be allowed because the event causing
the termination was not reasonably within the control of the
corporation or the majority of shareholders and the
corporation and majority shareholders did not plan the
termination. Ltr. Rul. 9340047, July 9, 1993.
TRUSTS. The decedent’s will passed property in trust to
the surviving spouse and children. The trust provided for
payment of trust annual net income to the spouse and the
children as needed for their support, with any undistributed
income accumulated. The surviving spouse was the trustee
and had a testamentary power to appoint trust corpus to the
descendants of the decedent. The trust allowed for payment
of death taxes if not paid by other estate property. The
executor wanted to transfer S corporation stock to the trust
and sought a state court reformation of the trust to provide
for annual distribution of all trust net income to the
surviving spouse and to remove the provision allowing for
payment of death taxes from the trust. The IRS ruled that
the reformed trust would qualify as a Subchapter S trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9338007, June 15, 1993.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
November 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.68 3.65 3.63 3.62
110% AFR 4.06 4.02 4.00 3.99
120% AFR 4.43 4.38 4.36 4.34
Mid-term
AFR 4.92 4.86 4.83 4.81
110% AFR 5.42 5.35 5.31 5.29
120% AFR 5.91 5.83 5.79 5.76
Long-term
AFR 5.84 5.76 5.72 5.69
110% AFR 6.44 6.34 6.29 6.26
120% AFR 7.03 6.91 6.85 6.81
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-ALM § 4.06.*  Beginning
with the January 3, 1994 payment, the monthly social
security benefit payments will increase 2.6 percent.  The
maximum amount of annual wages subject to Old Age
Survivors and Disability Insurance for 1993 is $60,600,
with all wages and self-employment income subject to the
medicare portion of the tax.  The maximum amount of
annual earnings before reduction of benefits is $11,160 for
persons aged 65 through 69 and $8,040 for persons under
age 65. The amount of wages necessary for one quarter of
coverage is $620.  HHS News Release, October 15, 1993.
TRUSTS-ALM Ch. 8.* Three trusts were created for the
same beneficiary, with the only difference being that one
trust provided that any undistributed annual net income be
distributed to the beneficiary’s issue. The three trusts were
consolidated with a provision that the undistributed net
annual income from the assets of the one trust be distributed
to the beneficiary’s issue. The IRS ruled that the
consolidation did not cause recognition of gain under I.R.C.
§ 1001. The trusts before and after consolidation had at least
one nonfamily member as co-trustee; therefore, the IRS
ruled that the beneficiary would not be considered the
owner of the trusts since any distribution of trust principal
required consent of an unrelated trustee. The IRS also ruled
that because the three trusts were irrevocable before
September 25, 1985, the consolidation did not subject the
trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9338015, June 23, 1993; Ltr. Rul.
9338021, June 24, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9339008, June 23,
1993.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
EASEMENT. The defendant leased farm land under an
open ended written lease. The landlord granted the plaintiff
an easement to construct and maintain a 14 inch carbon
dioxide pipeline through the land leased by the defendant
but the defendant did not join the the easement grant. The
court held that the landlord had retained a right to grant
rights in the subsurface use of the property and that a lease
of such rights created an estate dominant over the surface
lessee’s rights except for such damages caused to the
surface use. Therefore, the plaintiff had the right to enter the
property and make use of the easement and the defendant
was entitled to recover any damages to crops or land
occurring from the plaintiff’s use of the easement. Mobil
180                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.







PRIORITY. A group of ranchers with ranches
bordering on a creek petitioned the state Department of
Ecology to reduce the water usage of neighboring irrigation
wells which had junior rights in the ground water feeding
the creek. The Department of Ecology attempted to mediate
the dispute between the affected parties but eventually
issued a cease and desist order prohibiting the irrigation
farmers from withdrawing water from their wells for
irrigation. The farmers appealed the order to the court,
arguing that the Department of Ecology had no authority to
make a determination of the priority of the water users’
water rights. No formal ajudication of water rights had ever
occurred. The court held that the determination of the
priority of water rights was beyond the authority of the
Department of Ecology and was vested exclusively in the
courts. Rettkowski v. State, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiff owned 2.26
acres in an incorporated city next to a residential
subdivision. The property across the street was planted in
soybeans and was taxed as agricultural use property. The
plaintiff planted fescue and brome grasses on the tract and
contracted with a horse farmer to harvest the hay from the
land. However, because of a drought, no hay was produced.
The court held that because the land was used for the
production of an agricultural product, the land was eligible
for valuation as agricultural property to be valued at its use
value. Board of County Comm’rs v. Smith, 857 P.2d
1386 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993-1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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